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Abstract 
 
The objective of this paper is to identify the determinants of office capitalization rates for a panel of 52 
countries (developed and emerging countries) between 2000 and 2006. Our assumption, based on a Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, is that the capitalization rate should be at least proportional to the country’s risk 
perception, as measured by the risk premium on the 10-year government bond yield. Because of the 
endogeneity of the latter variable, our empirical methodology requires that we estimate first a model 
explaining the 10-year bond yield. It will be the occasion to discuss the determinants of the risk premium on 
the bond market. Using a SURE random effect Hausman-Taylor estimator (Hausman & Taylor, 1981), we 
also take into account the possible correlation between the country risk characteristics on the bond markets 
and those that determine the real estate market. Our results show that government bond yield is the main 
determinant of the capitalization rate. We estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the government bond 
yield will raise the capitalization rate by about 0.19 percentage point. Real estate variables play also a role, 
but to a lesser extent. Turning to determinants of the 10-year bond yield, macroeconomic fundamentals are 
significant determinants of the country risk premium, especially the capacity to honor short-term financial 
engagements. In addition, the country’s risk history has also very important effect on the investors’ current 
risk perception. 
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The last decade has coincided with a renewed interest for real estate from a broad range of investors. 
As noted by RREEF Research (2007), global direct real estate investment reached US$ 580 billion in 
2006, increasing threefold since 2001. In an era of falling interest rates, where financing became very 
inexpensive, global investors have looked increasingly at real estate as a secure and remunerative 
investment. In the same period, investments in emerging markets have soared to a great extent, real 
estate at the foremost, favored by high growth prospects, a stabilized economic situation after the 
financial crises of the 90s, a commitment to sound macroeconomic policies, an increasing integration 
into world financial markets, and fewer high return investment opportunities in developed countries. 
Hence, as capital flows have poured into real estate both in developed and emerging countries, we have 
observed a general downward trend in capitalization rates, a measure of real estate return defined as the 
cash flows earned on investment divided by price of the property. But, for all the excitement, one has to 
wonder if the price paid for a real estate asset is consistent with the country’s “true” rate of return 
expectation, based on actual real estate and macroeconomic fundamentals, and its country risk 
assessment. 
 
In particular, we should expect the capitalization rate (CAP or cap rate) to at least reflect the 
opportunity cost of capital and the risk premium associated with the country’s investment environment. 
Applying the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to real estate returns, our assumption is to compare 
the real estate capitalization rate to the 10-year government bond yield. This bond yield incorporates 
two components. On the one hand, government bonds are usually perceived as a low-risk investment, 
e.g. an opportunity cost of capital. Investors should expect a property market return at least equal the 
opportunity cost of capital, as measured here by the government bond yield. On the other hand, as 
investors seek an optimal allocation of their portfolio across countries, government bonds should also 
incorporate a risk premium component. Because they are determined by some common country 
characteristics, this real estate premium should reflect the country’s default risk. But in addition, the 
investor’s risk perception might also be determined by a whole series of country-specific real estate 
characteristics beyond the probability of default alone. 
 
There are very few studies investigating real estate at a macro level and even less for emerging 
countries. Empirical papers have mainly focused on U.S. (Sivitanidou & Sivitanides, 1996 and 1999; 
Sivitanides et al., 2001) or European markets (Bond, Karolyi & Sanders, 2003). But these are relatively 
stable and risk-free markets. To obtain further insights about the pricing of risk by international 
investor, it becomes essential to enlarge the sample to developing countries where we find greater 
variations in the characteristics that determine the risk premium. The inclusion of emerging markets is 
especially called for considering the substantial boom in cross-border investments going to these 
countries recently.  
 
Hence, the objective of this paper is thus to identify the determinants of office capitalization rates for a 
panel of 52 countries (developed and emerging countries) between 2000 and 2006. We will assume 
that, conditional on variables characterizing the office real estate market, the real estate risk premium 
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should be proportional to the spread in government 10-year bond yields relatively to the U.S... This 
spread should represent a good approximation of the country’s risk assessment since the United States 
are typically considered by global investors as the benchmark low-risk market. Based on this 
assumption, and by exploiting the panel dimensions of our data bank, we are then able to estimate a 
specific real estate risk assessment for each country. Moreover, because of the endogeneity of the bond 
yield as a determinant of the cap rate, our empirical methodology requires that we estimate a model 
explaining the 10-year bond yield. It will be the occasion to also discuss the determinants of the risk 
premium on the bond market. In particular, we try to investigate the significance of macroeconomic 
fundamentals and fixed country characteristics for the determination of the risk premium in both the 
bond and the real estate markets. 
 
The empirics of this paper bring forward some important econometric matters. As already mentioned, 
there are reasons to believe that the long-term interest rate is not an exogenous variable. Idiosyncratic 
shocks in the economy might affect both the bond and the real estate market. This might cause the 
residuals of the cap rate regression equation to be correlated to the interest rate; the least square 
estimator will thus be biased. To avoid this problem, we follow two empirical strategies. First, based on 
a paper by Docker, Rosen & Van Dyke (2004), we estimate an equation for the 10-year bond interest 
rate, using as determinants variables measuring macroeconomic fundamentals and other country-risk 
characteristics. Then, the fitted values obtained from this first step are in the cap rate regression instead 
of the actual value of the interest rate. The second empirical strategy will be to estimate both equations 
(interest and cap rate) in a Seemingly Unrelated Regression Equation (SURE) system, taking into 
account the correlation that might exist between the real estate and the bond market. The two equations 
will be presumably related because of idiosyncratic shocks that affect both markets, but also because of 
specific inter-temporal country risk characteristics that will determine the risk premiums on both the 
bond and the real estate market. More precisely, we follow Egger & Pfaffermayr (2004) and devise a 
SURE random effect Hausman-Taylor estimator (Hausman & Taylor, 1981). Instead of using the fixed 
effect (FE) estimator to estimate these country risk characteristics, we let the residuals of each equation 
include an individual effect, as in the random effect model, to insure that the SURE system picks up the 
correlation between the country specific risk effects across the two equations. This SURE Hausman-
Taylor random effect estimator as seldom been used so far in the empirical literature. 
 
Our results show that the risk premium, as measured by the 10-year bond interest rate, is the most 
important determinant of the capitalization rate. The 10-year bond yield alone explains between 41% 
and 44% of the cap rate. Real estate variables play also a role, but to a lesser extent. Turning to the 
determinants of the 10-year bond yield, macroeconomic fundamentals are significant determinants of 
the country risk premium, but above all the crucial determinant is the country’s capacity to honor short-
term financial engagements. In addition, the country’s risk history has also very important effect on the 
investors’ current risk perception, independently of the country’s actual macroeconomic situation. 
Finally, we show that both real estate and bond yields are characterized by a fixed country risk 
component and that these country effects might be correlated between these two markets. 
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The paper proceeds as follow. After a short review of literature (section 1), we introduce the CAPM 
model in section 2 and then present in section 3 the variables and data that will be used for the 
empirical investigation. In section 4, we describe in detail the two empirical strategies, discussing 
several important econometric issues. Section 5 is completely devoted to the bond yield equation, 
introducing first the empirical model and the variables determining the country risk (section 5.1) and 
then presenting the estimation results (section 5.2). Equipped with this model and the estimated results 
for the bond yield, we can finally proceed with the estimation of the cap rate equation in section 6, 
starting with the single equation regressions (first empirical strategy using the fitted values obtained 
from the interest rate regressions) in section 6.1, followed by the SURE results (second empirical 
strategy, using the SURE system) in section 6.2. 
 
1. Review of literature 
 
Several empirical studies have investigated the determinants of the cap rate (Froland, 1987; Evans, 
1990; Ambrose & Nourse, 1993). More recently, a number of papers have employed an investment 
approach based on the CAPM model to define the cap rates. Sivitanidou & Sivitanides (1996) examine 
the differences in cap rates across 43 US metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) between 1991 and 1995. 
They show that variations across markets are significantly determined by differences in office market 
characteristics such as the vacancy rate, the completion rate, the absorption rate, the size of the market 
and the historical volatility of the MSA. The study of Sivitanidou & Sivitanides (1999), using a panel 
of 10 years (1985 to 1995) and 18 MSAs, reveals that the capitalization rates are also determined by 
both time-variant local office market effects (office space absorption, vacancy rates, office employment 
growth stability and past rates of rental-income growth) and national capital market trends (inflation 
and stock returns). Exploiting the panel dimension of their data, both these papers confirm the 
existence of local fixed office market effects across MSAs (individual fixed effects). Bond, Karolyi & 
Sanders (2003) estimate a CAPM model to understand the returns of real estate securities in a selection 
of European countries, providing also for a country-specific market risk component, but including as 
well some global market risk factors. Jud & Winkler (1995) devise a model mixing both the CAPM 
model and the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) – the WACC is the rate of discount that 
reflects the average cost of debt and of equity capital. Indeed, their results indicate that the 
capitalization rates are determined by the cost of debt (measured by a BAA debt rating) and the cost of 
equity (measured by the total return on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index). 
 
Some studies can rely on longer time-series which allows them to investigate the stochastic properties 
of capitalization rates. Sivitanides, Southard, Torto & Wheaton (2001) also study the determinants of 
the capitalization rates across a panel of US MSAs, but using 16 annual observations. By exploiting 
this longer time dimension, these authors are able to model the capitalization rate as an adjustment 
process that evolves in time around an equilibrium value. Dokko, Edelstein, Pomer & Urdang (1991) 
and Hendershott & MacGregor (2005) use an Error Correction Model (ECM) to estimate the return-to-
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equilibrium properties of real estate returns, while Yiu & Hui (2006) extend the CAPM model by 
allowing for a time-varying discount rate. Then, they use the cointegration methodology to test for the 
existence of a long-term relationship between the capitalization rate and the growth-adjusted discount 
rate. 
 
However, all this literature focuses on developed and mature markets (mostly the U.S. and European 
markets). The originality of this study is to include a set of emerging countries which are well 
integrated in the global property market. This extended sample comes at a cost though: real estate data 
are scare for emerging countries before year 2000. Thus, we cannot construct long time-series, which 
would have been more appropriate to study the stochastic properties of the capitalization rate. Yet, with 
7 annual observations (from 2000 to 2006) and a sample of 52 developed and emerging countries, we 
can rely on a relatively large panel of 371 observations, which enables us to estimate country-specific 
risk components, similarly to Sivitanidou & Sivitanides (1996) and Sivitanidou & Sivitanides (1999). 
 
Dockers, Rosen & Van Dyke (2004) include both developed and emerging markets in their sample, but 
in a single cross-section for year 1999. These authors attempt to estimate the hurdle rate on the real 
estate market. In a first step, they determine the economic/financial risk in the country, based on a 
series of risk variables. In a second step, they use the estimated country risk computed in the first step 
as a determinant of the capitalization rate. We will also follow a similar path. However, they define the 
residuals of their regression as a measure for the country risk premium. But, by construction, the OLS 
regression residuals are an independent and identically-distributed (i.i.d.) component which should be 
completely random. They cannot be interpreted as risk premium. However, by using panel data, we are 
able to estimate country-specific effects that we interpret as being an inter-temporal country risk 
assessment. 
 
2. The Model 
 
The capitalization rate of a given real estate investment is typically defined as the ratio of net operating 
income (NOIt) on the value of property (Vt) at time t: 
 
(1)  
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The property value can be based on the market sales price of the property at time t. If investors are 
rational, this price should exactly reflect the sum of present value cash flows they expect to receive in 
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where T is the property’s life expectancy, dt is the discount rate and the second expression in brackets 
represents the resale value of the property at time Z+1. Simplifying equation (2): 
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We can assume that NOI is equal to actual cash flows, that cash flows can be approximated by rents 
and that future rents are expected to grow at a rate gt: 
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where !  is simply an approximation parameter. Inserting the cash flow CFt approximation (5) in 
equation (3): 
 
(6) ( )
( ) !"
!
#
$
!%
!
&
'
(
(
)
*
+
+
,
-
+
+
.= /
=
T
1t
t
t
t
t
tt
d1
g1
RENTP  
 
We can now substitute the NOI equation (4) and the price equation (6) in the capitalization rate 
equation (1): 
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Simplifying equation (7), we can define the equilibrium capitalization rate (Ce): 
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where et is an i.i.d. shock that might affect the real estate market at time t. Notice that the rent term 
disappears in equation (8). As rents (or cash flows) are expected to increase, investors are assumed to 
take this increase fully into account in the valuation of the property, leaving the capitalization rate level 
unchanged. Hence, the capitalization rate should evolve as a mean-reverting stationary process in time. 
In the very short-term, a surge in rents will put upward pressure on the capitalization rate. But, as 
investors integrate this information in their valuation estimates, the price of the property should also 
increase, thereby reducing the capitalization rate back to its initial value. The adjustment might not be 
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immediate because of some market inefficiencies, but the capitalization rate should gradually return to 
its long-term equilibrium value. 
 
From equation (8), the capitalization rate depends on two factors: the discount factor dt and the growth 
of rents gt. In fact, equation (8) can also be interpreted as the growth-adjusted required nominal return 
on property. As in Jud & Winkler (1995), Sivitanidou & Sivitanides (1999), Hendershott & MacGregor 
(2005) and Yiu & Hui (2006), this required return on property can be derived using the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (CAPM): 
 
(9) ( )[ ]tttttt !RrfRopâ!Rrfd +!++=  
 
where Rrft is the real risk-free rate, t!  is the inflation rate and Ropt is the opportunity cost of capital. 
However, some risks are particular to the real estate market and will not affect necessarily other types 
of investments. The capitalization rate should also reflect that specific real estate risk. Re-arranging 
equation (9) and adding a real estate specific risk premium (Rre): 
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The expression to the left of the equality is the spread in the return on property, in real terms, against 
the risk-free rate. Thus, the CAPM, defined by equation 10, assumes that this spread should be at least 
equal to the spread in an alternative investment (the opportunity costs) in real terms, plus a component 
expressing the additional perceived risks specific to the real estate market. The !  is the property beta: 
the spread in the real estate market should be proportional to the spread in the alternative investment, 
but not exactly equal given that both investments are of different nature. 
 
Using the CAPM model, we can redefine equation (8) as: 
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The empirical model will therefore relate the capitalization rate to a nominal risk-free rate, the spread 
in the return on an alternative investment, a specific real estate risk component and some variables 
approximating the expected growth in cash flows. We expect a positive relationship between these 
determinants of the capitalization rate, except for the growth expectations: higher expectations of cash 
flows growth should increase the price of property and thus decrease the cap rate. 
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3. The variables and data 
 
The objective of this paper is to measure the country risk premium in the real estate market. One 
general indicator of country risk is the spread in the 10-year government bond’s yield (GovBond) with 
respect to the U.S. 10-year T-Bond At the same time, the government bond yield can be considered as a 
relevant opportunity cost of capital, since the bond market is perceived as a low-risk safe investment. 
 
It follows that, in equation (11), the return on the alternative investment Ropt will be define by 
GovBond, while the risk-free rate Rrft will be set to the U.S. 10-year T-Bond (US-TBOND). Both rates 
are in nominal terms, incorporating the inflation component
t
! . From equation (11), along with the 
spread in the bond market, the determinants of the capitalization rate is decomposed into two further 
components: the growth in cash flows and the specific real estate risk. 
 
Growth expectations can be derived on current disposable information. Hence, we will use the one-year 
lagged value (at time t-1) of the inflation rate (INFL) and of the real GDP growth (GDP%) to 
approximate the expected growth of cash flows at time t. Instead of using direct growth proxies, we can 
also rely on annual variations in the vacancy rate (VACANCY%). When the vacancy rate increases, we 
should observe a lower (or negative) rental growth rate; when the vacancy rate decreases, the 
adjustment between demand and supply is tighter and we should therefore observe an increase in the 
rental growth rate1. Note that when using VACANCY%, we lose the observations of year 2000. 
                                                
1 Notice that the level and the deviation of the vacancy rate have different effects on the real estate 
market. The real estate cycle theory can be broke down in three types of cycles: physical market cycle, 
rental growth cycle and financial market cycle (see Mueller 1995). For the purpose of this paper, we 
will only discuss the first two types. The physical market cycle characterized by the vacancy rate 
indicates the interaction between the supply demand function in a real estate market. As described by 
Mueller (1995), the physical market cycle is divided into four quadrants based upon the rate of change 
in both demand and supply. The first two quadrants - recovery and expansion - are up-cycles where the 
growth rate of demand outstrips that of supply, whereas the other two quadrants – hypersupply and 
recession - are down-cycles where the demand growth rate is below that of supply. The addition of the 
long term average vacancy rate (LTAV) [also called natural vacancy rate and formerly called the 
equilibrium level by Mueller (1995)] in the physical cycle theory is very important as it enables to 
determine in which quadrant the marketplace is located therefore establishing if the latter is under or 
oversupplied by space. Furthermore, one must know that demand and supply dynamics differ whether 
the market is located below or above the LTAV and that the latter differs for each property type (office, 
retail, industrial and multi-residential) and markets.  
 
The role of the LTAV in the rental growth theory is imperative as it enables to estimate the rate of 
rental growth the marketplace will generate during the cycle. When the vacancy rate is above its 
LTAV, the rate of rental growth is slower than the inflation rate level while when it is below its LTAV 
rental growth is faster than the rate of inflation. Moreover, as mentioned in Mueller (1995), the growth 
rate in rental rates will steadily increase during up-cycles (trough to peak) and steadily decrease during 
down-cycles (peak to trough). More specifically, during the recovery phase rents tend to decrease near 
the bottom of the cycle and to slowly increase as it approaches the LTAV because demand is absorbing 
the excess supply of space in the marketplace. Additionally, rents will augment at the rate of inflation 
when the vacancy rate equals its LTAV. Once the vacancy rate moves into the expansion phase of the 
cycle, rents grow at a faster pace than inflation because of less available spaces in the market and will 
reach the market peak when demand and supply are in equilibrium. During this phase, rent levels will 
reach the economic construction cost level that will allow profitable new construction projects to start. 
As the market moves toward equilibrium the number of development projects will increase and may 
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In our model, cash flows are approximated by rents. However, the rent variable cancels out in equation 
(8) since rents should be fully taken into account in the price of real estate. But in reality, prices may 
not adjust perfectly and immediately to changes in rents. As a control, we construct an index of real 
rents (RENT). Using data on the rent levels, we simply impute the evolution of rents (in real terms) 
from an initial index set to 100 in year 2000 for all countries2. 
 
The liquidity of the market is another important determinant of the capitalization rate. Ceteris paribus, 
investors may prefer to operate in a larger market to minimize transaction costs and hedge out the 
variability in price (Bernoth, von Hagen & Schuknecht, 2004; Favero, Pagano & von Thadden, 2004). 
A market with a large inventory and a more developed property market3 should guarantee investors less 
volatility in the standard deviation of returns because market inefficiencies are lower than in an 
emerging property market. For these reasons, we expect illiquid markets to display higher 
capitalization rates, therefore higher market returns, to compensate for the larger transaction costs 
investors need to bear to invest into that market. To measure the liquidity of the real estate market, we 
will use two variables. First, the depth of the market (DEPTH) is defined as the total inventory of office 
spaces (in square feet) in a city divided by its population4. Second, the total inventory divided by the 
city’s area (DENSITY) gives an approximation of the market supply. In addition, we have constructed 
a dummy variable taking the value of 1 when REITs (Real Estate Investment Trusts) are in operation in 
the country’s real estate market (from the first year of existence), and zero otherwise. The existence of 
REIT operators should enhance the liquidity of the real estate market. 
 
We also consider three qualitative country indexes that might also affect the risk perception, compiled 
by the ICRG/PRS Group: the bureaucracy quality (BUREAU), law & order (LAW) which assess the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system and the popular observance of the law, and the investment 
profile (IPROFIL) which is a composite rating that combines three types of investment risks: contract 
viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and payments delays. 
 
Finally, we include time-fixed effects to capture global trends in the real estate market, for instance: the 
world real estate cycle, the global supply of funds going into real estate, the general “appetite for risk” 
of international investors, etc. 
 
                                                                                                                                       
bring the market into a state of oversupply (quadrant III or hypersupply phase) if supply exceeds 
demand. In the hypersupply phase, rental growth will remain above the inflation rate until the vacancy 
declines to reach its LTAV. In the case where supply continues to exceed demand, the vacancy rate 
will increase above its LTAV moving into the recession phase (or quadrant IV). In this phase, one can 
observe below inflation or negative rental growth until the cycle reaches its trough as new construction 
and completions come to an end.  
2 By using an index, we avoid the issue of purchasing power differences across countries.  
3 More precisely, office buildings in our case. 
4 The best variable to calculate the depth of an office market is the number of employees working in the 
services industry, but the unavailability of the data at the city level for most of the emerging countries 
forced us to use population data.  
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Table 1 summarizes the set of variables that will be used as determinants of the capitalization rate. The 
rent index (RENT) and the two real estate variables DEPTH and DENSITY are not in percentage 
format, contrary to the dependent variable CAP and the other determinants. Thus, these variables are 
transformed into logs in all regressions, which will insure a stronger fit. 
 
Table 1: List of variables for the capitalization rate equation 
Dependent variable 
→ Capitalization rate (CAP) 
 
Risk premium 
→ 10-year bond yields (GovBond) 
 
Growth of cash flow 
→ Rent index in logs (RENT) 
→ Vacancy rate (VACANCY%): annual changes 
→ Real GDP growth lagged one year (GDP%(-1)) 
→ Inflation rate lagged one year  (INFL(-1)) 
 
Real estate variables 
→ Depth of the market in logs (DEPTH): total inventory /population 
→ Density of the market in logs (DENSITY): total inventory /area 
→ Existence of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT): 1 or 0 otherwise 
 
Qualitative variables 
→ Bureaucracy quality (BUREAU) 
→ Law & order (LAW) 
→ Investment profile (IPROFIL) 
 
Data  
 
We focus on a set of 52 developed and developing countries (see the list of countries in Appendix 1) 
for which annual office market data are available on a consistent basis. For most of these countries, real 
estate figures are quite hard to find before year 2000. But from 2000 up to 2006, we were able to 
construct an almost balanced data bank, with only two missing observations for Venezuela for years 
1999 and 20005. In total, we obtain a panel of 362 observations, with T=7 annual observations (2000 to 
2006) over N=52 countries (and two missing observations). 
 
Office market data (cap rates, rents, vacancy rates and inventory) are compiled using a combination of 
different real estate sources: Colliers, DTZ, Bentall, REIS and Ober Haus Real Estate Advisors. 
Furthermore, office market data include all classes of office space (A, B and C) and are typically given 
at the metropolitan level. For most countries, the data are available consistently only for a single city, 
the Capital-City or the country’s main metropolis). But for some countries, we have data on several 
important cities, in which case we have chosen to take the weighted-average value by each city’s 
population6. In Appendix 2, we show the list of cities from which national figures have been inferred 
for each country. 
                                                
5 For Venezuela, we were not able to find consistent observations on real estate data for these two 
years. 
6 To compute these national weighted averages, we must use, for each country, the same set of cities 
across real estate variables to insure the consistency of the data. 
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Graph 1: Average spread (2004-2006) in the capitalization rate 
against the U.S. capitalization rate 
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Data on annual government 10-year bond yields are taken from Bloomberg, Datastream and Eurostat. 
Some countries in our sample do not have a government bond market or bonds with a 10-year maturity. 
In these cases, we use the available rate that comes closest to a long-term interest rate7. The 
International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook provides statistics on inflation and GDP 
growth. Appendix 3 offers a more detailed description of the data and sources. 
 
Graph 1 and Graph 2 shows respectively the spread in the capitalization rate and in GovBond against 
the U.S. (average 2004-2006).The ranking between both spreads is quite close. All member-states of 
the European Union (except Poland and Hungary) have long-term interest rates that are systematically 
lower than the U.S.. Even if the U.S. has often been perceived as the risk-free benchmark country, the 
European Union – especially members of the Eurozone – may have now become a more relevant 
benchmark nowadays. Negative spreads against the U.S. are also observed in some “Asian Tigers” 
(Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) and in Malaysia, these countries being all characterized by a very 
high level of trade and investment openness. Japan may be in a special economic situation, having a 
nominal discount rate close to zero in the last couple of years. The highest spreads are found in 
                                                
7 For some countries, we have to use the longest government bond yield available (mostly, 5-year 
maturities) or the lending rate. But this concerns mostly countries with a higher risk assessment. Hence, 
since these countries tend to have a much higher rate level. Thus, the spread with the U.S. bond yield 
still represents a good approximation of the country risk.  
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developing countries, and especially those that experienced a financial crisis over the last decade 
(Argentina, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, etc.). 
 
Graph 2: Average spread (2004-2006) between the 10-year 
government bond yield and the U.S. T-Bond 
 
Sources: Bloomberg, Datastream and Eurostat.
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Graph 3: Relationship between capitalization rate and the 10-year government bond yield 
(average 2004-2006). 
Sources for the 10-year bond yields: Bloomberg, Datastream and Eurostat. Sources for the cap rate: Colliers, DTZ, Bentall, REIS and 
Ober Haus Real Estate Advisors.
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To illustrate the relationship between both bond yields, Graph 3 relates the capitalization rate (in 
ascending order) with the long-term bond yields (all in annual average 2004-2006). Looking at the 
bond yield trend across countries (the red straight line), we can indeed observe a positive relationship 
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with the capitalization rate, but there are some large discrepancies. This suggests that other 
determinants are driving the capitalization rates, and we expect variables characterizing the office real 
estate market to also have an impact on the property market return. 
 
4. Empirical strategy and Econometrics issues 
 
In the capitalization rate equation (11), GovBond might be an endogenous variable, in the sense of 
being correlated with the residual term et. To deal with this issue, we will use two empirical strategies. 
In the first strategy we will use an orthogonalized fitted estimation of the 10-year bond yield in the cap 
rate regression while, in the second strategy, we will estimate both the cap rate and the long-term 
interest rates within a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) system (Zellner, 1962). 
 
Formally, we will in fact estimate two equations: 
 
(12) 
ittitit
eXGovBond 11
1
+++= !"#  
 
(13) 
ittititit
eXGovBondCAP 22
32
++++= !""#          for    i = 1,…, N     and     t = 1,…, T. 
 
where i is the country index, t the time index, X1 are some determinants of the long-term interest rate 
spread, X2 are the real estate and cash flow variables determining the cap rate (defined previously), 
t
!  
are time specific effects, e1it and e2it are i.i.d. residual terms. Section 5 below is completely dedicated 
to the GovBond equation (empirical model and estimation). 
 
Suppose that the contemporaneous residuals are correlated between equations (12) and (13): 
 
( ) 02e1e itit !E  
This might occur if an economic shock in the economy impacts both long-term bond yields and the 
office real estate market fundamentals. Then, GovBond will not be exogenous in equation (13): 
 
( ) 02E !
itit
eGovBond  
 
and the OLS estimation will be biased. 
 
We can assume that investors assign to each country a general risk perception, depending on time-
invariant characteristics. Thus, a country will be associated to a specific risk premium, notwithstanding 
the actual state of its economy or real estate market: 
 
(14)  
itititit
euXGovBond 111
1
++++= !"#  
 14 
 
(15) 
itittititit
euXGovBondCAP 222
32
+++++= !""#  
 
where u1i and u2i are the country-specific effects in, respectively, the GovBond equation and in the CAP 
equation. We can assume that the individual country effects are random, e.g. they are part on the 
residual term: 
 
(16)  
ittitit
zXGovBond 11
1
+++= !"#                           where     itiit 1e1u1z +=  
 
(17) 
ittititit
zXGovBondCAP 22
32
++++= !""#          where     itiit 2e2u2z +=  
 
The random effects (u1i, u2i) and the remaining residuals (e1it, e2it) are assumed to have zero mean, 
and: 
 
( ) 01e1u itit =E  
 
( ) 02e2u itit =E  
 
This random effect (RE) formulation brings forth another type of correlation between the CAP and the 
GovBond equation. In addition to the correlation across equations ( ) 02e1e itit !E , we could expect a 
further correlation between the individual effect u1t in the GovBond equation with the individual effect 
u2t in the CAP equation: 
 
( ) 02u1u itit !E  
 
The country-specific risk perception on the bond market will surely be linked to the specific risk 
perception on the office real estate market. Some types of country risks will presumably affect only the 
real estate market, but not the bond market, and vice-versa. For example, landlord legal rights and rent 
regulations will have an impact on the capitalization rate but not on the bond market. But some 
unobservable country risk characteristics might affect both the bond and the real estate yields. 
Therefore, the long-term bond yields will also be correlated with the individual effect in the CAP 
equation: 
 
( ) 02E !
itit
uGovBond  
 
Since we still have that: 
 
( ) 02E !
itit
eGovBond  
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Hence: 
 
( ) 0z2GovBond
itit
!E  
 
GovBond is said to be doubly endogenous since it might be correlated with both the idiosyncratic shock 
e2it and the individual effect u2i in the CAP equation. 
 
The first strategy is as follows. Instead of relying on the random effect specification, the specific 
country risk component may also be estimated by the fixed effect (FE) estimator. This is equivalent to 
adding country dummies in equations (14) and (15) to estimate the country specific effect u1i and u2i. It 
so happens that the fixed effect estimator leads to exactly the same coefficient results as the ‘within 
estimator’, even if both estimators are conceptually different. The within estimator takes all variables of 
the model in deviations from their respective individual country average, and then estimates the 
transformed model by OLS. Hence, the individual effects are eliminated by this within transformation, 
which thereby removes the correlation between u1i and u2i, but also between u2i and GovBond (or any 
other RHS variables). 
 
Then, as in Docker, Rosen & Van Dyke (2004), to handle the further endogeneity of the GovBond 
variable with respect to the idiosyncratic shock e2it, we use the fitted values of GovBond. We first 
estimate the determinants of the 10-year bond yield. Then, we add into the CAP equation the fitted 
values obtained from this first regression in place of GovBond. Hence, since the fitted values do not 
include the residual component e1it, we have that: 
 
( ) 0e2GovBond
itit
!E  
 
Hence, the first strategy consists of three steps: 
Step 1: estimate the GovBond equation (14) with the FE effect estimator; 
Step 2: compute the fitted values of this regression; 
Step 3: estimate the CAP equation (15) with the FE effect estimator, but with the fitted values 
instead of the actual values of the interest rate. 
 
But more generally, any type of correlation between the two equations can be handled using the SURE 
estimator. This will be our second strategy. With country fixed effects in each equation, the only 
remaining cross-equation correlation is between the idiosyncratic shocks e1it and e2it. Hence, equation 
(14) and (15) can be efficiently estimated within a SURE system of equations, taking into account this 
correlation in the idiosyncratic residuals. 
 
However, it might be interesting to specifically consider the correlation between the individual effects 
u1i and u2i. Instead of eliminating this correlation by using the FE estimator, we could estimate 
equations (16) and (17) within a SURE random effect estimator (SURE-RE). By doing so, we take into 
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account the correlation between the whole residual terms z1it and z2it, which include both the 
idiosyncratic shocks and the individual effects. However, this SURE-RE estimator will not be efficient 
because the presence of the constant terms u1i and u2i in the residuals z1it and z2it induces a form of 
autocorrelation in time. In addition, the SURE-RE may be biased because we have assumed that the 
individual effect u2i is still correlated with the GovBond variable in the CAP equation. More generally, 
we could expect the individual effects to be correlated with any of the X variables. For example, a 
country having a high level of short-term debt in average might be perceived as riskier than other 
countries, notwithstanding the annual evolution of the short-term debt. One solution is to use the 
instrumental variables (IV) methodology. The objective is to find instruments that are correlated with 
the X variables, but not with the individual effects. This is not an easy task, and the within estimator, 
which is unbiased and efficient, seems a more convenient solution. But, by subtracting out the fixed 
effects ui, the within estimator discards information about the channels linking the long-term bond yield 
and the cap rate. 
 
To handle these problems, we follow Egger & Pfaffermayr (2004) and devise a SURE Hausman-Taylor 
estimator. The approach of Egger & Pfaffermayr (2004) combines the Hausman-Taylor random effect 
IV estimator with the SURE methodology. To remove the autocorrelation, the first step is to transform 
each equation by pre-multiplying all variables with the usual GSL random effect expression (see 
Baltagi, 1980): 
 
nN
BW !+="# 2/1    with    !
"
#
$
%
& '+''=( 2u
2
w
2
w T           for each equation. 
 
where WN is the within operator, BN is the between operator, 2u!  is the variance of the individual 
effects (u1i or u2i) and 2w!  is the estimated variance of the remaining residual (e1it or e2it). These 
variances are obtained as usual from the random effect GSL feasible estimator. Then to overcome the 
endogeneity problem, we also rely on the IV methodology, in the spirit of Hausman & Taylor (1981). 
These authors distinguish between variables (time-variant and time-invariant variables) which are not 
correlated with the individual effects (doubly exogenous variables) and variables which are correlated 
with the individual effects (singly exogenous variables). As instruments for the singly exogenous 
variables, Hausman & Taylor proposes to use the following set of variables: the individual mean (the 
country average of each variable) of the doubly exogenous variables, along with their deviation from 
this individual mean, the doubly exogenous time-invariant variables and the singly exogenous variables 
in deviation from their individual mean. By construction, these last variables, by removing the 
individual mean should not be correlated with the individual fixed effects. Thus, in a second step, we 
estimate both equations in a SURE system, using the GLS transformed equations and the Hausman-
Taylor instruments. 
 
Hence, the second strategy consists of the following steps: 
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Step 1: estimate 2/1!"  for each equation using random effect GSL feasible estimator and the 
Hausman-Taylor instruments8; 
Step 2: premultiply all variables with 2/1!" ; 
Step 3: compute the instrumented values for each endogenous variables, using the Hausman-
Taylor instruments; 
Step 4: estimate both modified equations (using the GLS transformation and the instrumented 
endogenous variables) with SURE. 
 
To close this discussion on the econometric methodology, notice that the FE estimator, which amounts 
to incorporating country dummies in the regression, is equivalent to assuming that each country has its 
own constant term in each equation. Then, the estimated coefficient of this country dummy may be 
interpreted as the inter-temporal (up to our time sample) country-specific risk premium9, conditional on 
variables X. 
 
Note also that in equation (12) to (17), we do not use spreads, but the actual level of the bond yield and 
cap rate. The spreads are defined relatively to the U.S. T-Bond. In econometric terms, since these U.S. 
yields are constant across countries for a given year, using the spread or the actual level will only affect 
the constant terms ( !  and ! ) in the regressions when time effects ( t! ) are included. Since, for 
identification, we need to exclude one country when using country fixed effects, we choose to exclude 
the U.S., so that all country-specific effects can be directly interpreted relatively to the U.S. own 
specific effect, given by the coefficient of the constants. This means that we could estimate the U.S. 
country-specific risk when using the actual levels, whereas the U.S. T-Bond yield is only the 
“assumed” risk-free rate. 
 
5. The 10-year government bond spread equation 
 
Both our empirical strategies require that we specify and estimate an empirical model for the GovBond 
equation. This is done in the next section. 
 
5.1. The empirical model 
 
The risk premium on the GovBond should reflect the sovereign default risk on the country’s debt. As 
determinants of GovBond, we will use a set of macroeconomic variables measuring the country’s 
solvency and characterizing its macroeconomic policies. In choosing these determinants of sovereign 
risk, we follow a large empirical literature on government default risks10 (see for example Alesina et 
                                                
8 Note that the Hausman-Taylor instruments are used to compute the between variance in the first step, 
to obtain unbiased coefficients for the GLS feasible estimator. 
9 Lemmen & Goodhart (1999) interpret similarly their country-fixed effects in estimating the European 
credit risk in a panel setting.  
10 Rowland & Torres (2004) offer an interesting summary of all the determinants of credit spreads used 
in the literature.  
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al., 1992; Cantor & Packer, 1996; Eichengreen & Mody, 1998; Lemmen & Goodhart, 1999; Rowland 
& Torres, 2004). The sources of the data are detailed in Appendix 3, while Table 2 lists all the variables 
that will be considered in the GovBond equation. 
 
Solvency variables 
 
Debt variables: the country’s level of indebtedness could simply be measured by the stock of the 
government’s debt (DEBT) in proportion to the GDP. We also consider the government interest 
payments as a percentage of government revenues (IDEBT), the government debt as a percentage of 
government revenues (DEBTREVENUE) and the foreign debt as a percentage of total debt 
(FOREIGNDEBT)11. We expect the risk premium to increase with the level of indebtedness. 
 
Liquidities: given the level of indebtedness, the liquidity variables measure the country’s capacity to 
honor its financial engagements 12. The government’s budget balance (BUDGETBAL) as a percentage 
of GDP is a good indicator of the government flexibility to repay debt and interests. A budget deficit is 
also a flow worsening the stock of debt. Exports as a percentage of GDP (EXP) and the current account 
as a percentage of GDP (ACCOUNT) are also considered, as liquidities can be obtained from export 
proceeds. Moreover, persistent current account deficits may not be sustainable in the long-term and this 
may have an effect on the stability of the currency. We also use the international liquidities as a 
percentage of months of import cover (LIQUID) and the official foreign exchange reserves in level 
(RESERVES) or as a percentage of GDP (RESERVES%). Greater liquidities should enhance the 
country’s capacity to confront financial engagements, and thus reduce the risk of default (thus the risk 
premium). 
 
Macroeconomic policies 
 
Real GDP growth (GDP%): a strong economic expansion may signal the existence of greater 
investment opportunities in the country. In addition, a higher level of economic growth generates a 
stronger fiscal ability to repay debt. We thus expect a negative relationship between real GDP growth 
and the bond yield. 
 
Inflation (INFL): a strong or instable inflation rate may reflect the mismanagement of the country’s 
monetary policy. As high inflation rates tend to generate uncertainty, we expect a positive relationship 
between the inflation rate and the bond yield. As a measure of inflation, we use the inflation rate in 
consumer prices. 
 
All the above variables (solvency and macroeconomic policies) will be referred as the country’s 
macroeconomic fundamentals. The macroeconomic data comes from the IMF’s World Economic 
                                                
11 We could also use the short-term debt as a percentage of total external debt or the total debt service 
as a percentage of GNI. However, these two variables are only available for emerging countries.  
12 Not to be confounded with the liquidity of the real estate market.  
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Outlook, the World Bank’s World Development Indicator and the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). 
Some solvency variables are also provided by Moody’s Country Credit Statistical Handbook. 
 
Table 2: List of variables for the long-term interest rate equation 
Dependent variable 
→ 10-year government bond yields, annual average (GovBond) 
 
Solvency variables 
→ Government’s debt as a % of GDP (DEBT) 
→ Government interest payment as a % of government revenues (IDEBT) 
→ Government debt as a % of government revenues (DEBTREVENUE) 
→ Foreign debt as a % of total debt (FOREIGNDEBT) 
→ Short-term debt as a % of total external debt (SHORTDEBT) 
→ Total debt service as a % of GNI (DEBTSERVICE) 
→ Government’s budget balance as a % of GDP (BUDGETBAL) 
→ Exports as a % of GDP (EXP) 
→ Current account as a % of GDP (ACCOUNT) 
→ International liquidities as a percentage of months of import cover (LIQUID) 
→ Official foreign exchange reserves (RESERVES) 
→ Official foreign exchange reserves as a % of GDP (RESERVESP) 
 
Macroeconomic policies 
→ Real GDP growth (GDP%) 
→ Inflation rate (INFL) 
 
Qualitative index 
→ Bureaucracy quality (BUREAU) 
→ Law & order (LAW) 
→ Investment profile (IPROFIL) 
→ Moody’s sovereign risk ratings (MOODY) 
→ Standard & Poor's sovereign risk ratings (S&P) 
 
History variables 
→ Impulse function of short-term interest rate highest deviation between 1995 and 1999 (IMPULSE) 
→ Annual average of monthly interest rate in the three past years (LAGRATE) 
→ Existence of a lending arrangement with the IMF in the current and two last years (IMF5) 
→ Existence of any lending arrangement with the IMF between 1995 and 1998 (IMF2) 
 
International conditions 
→ 3-month bond yields (SHORTUS) 
→ New York Stock Exchange Composite Share Price Index (STOCKUS) 
 
Qualitative risk variables 
 
We also consider the qualitative indexes compiled by the ICRG/PRS Group and defined previously for 
the CAP equation: the bureaucracy quality (BUREAU), law & order (LAW) and the investment profile 
(IPROFIL). One could also use the sovereign risk rating of Moody’s (MOODY) or Standard & Poor's 
(S&P) as a determinant of the risk premium. Moody’s sovereign risks are classified in 21 ratings, from 
“Aaa” (obligations that are judged to be of the highest quality, with minimal credit risk) to “C” (lowest 
rated class of bonds, typically in default, with little prospect for recovery of principal or interest). We 
have assigned to each rating a value from 1 to 21, from the best rating “Aaa” to the worst rating “C”. 
Similarly, we have transformed the Standard & Poor's sovereign risk rating in 29 real values, from the 
best rating (“AAA+”, extremely strong capacity to meet its financial commitments.) to the worst (“D”, 
default). But these ratings are composite indexes that take into account a whole series of economic 
variables and political risks. Hence, the risk ratings will be, by construction, highly correlated to the 
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previous qualitative variables, but also with many of the macroeconomic fundamentals (Cantor & 
Packer, 1996). Therefore, in the GovBond equation, the sovereign risk ratings and the set of all other 
variables should be used alternatively. 
 
History of risk 
 
One very important factor influencing the investors’ perception is the country’s recent history of 
lending and risks. A country that suffered a financial crisis or a period of macroeconomic instability 
might sustain a higher risk premium in the following years, notwithstanding the current quality of the 
economic fundamentals or macro policies. Indeed, recent financial crises might affect the investor’s 
current risk perception and it might take some time before they are able to appraise their risk evaluation 
strictly according to the country’s actual economic and financial situation. Several countries in our 
sample, mostly Asian emerging markets but also Russia, Turkey and some Latin American countries 
have experienced the financial crises that occurred in 1997-1998, Typically, a financial crisis can be 
identified by sharp and sudden increases in the country’s short-term interest rates. Then, when 
confidence is restored, the short-term interest rates gradually return back to its equilibrium value13. 
Hence, our sample starts in 1999 with many countries having very high long-term interest rates - a 
situation that cannot be wholly explained by the macroeconomic fundamentals in 1999 - followed 
thereafter by a downward trend in global interest rates. 
 
Therefore, to measure the impact of a past financial crisis on current risk perceptions, we have devised 
a special indicator, called IMPULSE. Using monthly data on short-term interest rates (ISHORT) from 
1994 to 2006 (data from Datastream), we estimate an autoregressive model AR(12) to determine the 
stochastic process of the short-term interest rates for each country: 
 
it
k
kitikit
eISHORTISORT +=!
=
"
12
1
#           for  k = 12 lags. 
 
where i is again the country index and t is the time index. The number of lags is set to 12 (one year of 
monthly observations). Based on this AR(12) estimation, we can simulate the effect of a given shock 
on future values of the risk premium for each country. More precisely, we first compute the deviation 
between the highest peak in the short-term interest rate - occurring between 1994 and 2000 - and the 
average level before the crisis. This deviation is a measure of the magnitude of the shock on the 
economy. Then, we simply simulate the effect of this shock on future interest rate values, using an 
impulse response function based on the AR(12) estimates. Hence, for each subsequent month, we get a 
value of what would be the remaining effect of the initial shock on the risk premium. To get annual 
values, we simply take the value of the impulse function in December of each year. For the countries 
that have not experienced the effects of a financial crisis, we could not identify a clear peak in short-
                                                
13 The risk premium might be then modeled as a stochastic long memory process. A long memory 
process is a stationary process that returns to equilibrium very slowly after a shock.   
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term interest rates; therefore the indicator is set to zero14. The higher the deviation in the short-term 
interest rate (the shock caused by the crisis) and the closer the shock to the beginning of our time 
sample, the higher the values of the impulse function. Hence, this variable encompasses three elements: 
1. the fact of being affected or not by a financial crisis; 2. the magnitude of the crisis; 3. the estimated 
evolution in time of this shock. In that sense, the variable works as a sort of time trend specific to each 
country that experienced a financial crisis. 
 
Graph 3: The case of Indonesia: Short-term interest rates and Impulse function 
Indonesia's short-term interest rate
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14 More precisely, the indicator is set to zero for countries for which the deviation between the average 
short-term interest rate and the highest value is lower than 3 p.p. (percentage points) and that applies 
for instance to all developed countries. 
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For most countries for which we have detected a period of financial instability between 1994 and 2000, 
the highest level of short-term interest rates was observed in December 1998. In Graph 3, we illustrate 
the typical situation of Indonesia, with a peak in short-term interest rates in December 1998. The 
average rate before the crisis is also shown (dotted line). Then, underneath, we plotted the impulse 
function of a shock equal to the deviation between the average rate and the highest peak. The effect of 
the shock gradually diminishes in time, then oscillates around zero and finally vanishes. 
 
In addition, we have also devised three other variables of risk history that will show to be useful. First, 
we use the annual average of short-term interest rates over the last three years (LAGRATE). A 
country’s lending and crisis history can also be inferred by its relationship with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF). We have constructed two dummy variables based on the existence of a lending 
arrangement with the IMF: IMF5 take a value of 1 if the country has had any lending arrangement with 
the IMF in the current or the last 2 years, and IMF2 assigns to each country a fixed value equal to the 
total number of years the country has resorted to the IMF between 1995 and 1999. 
 
Global conditions 
 
Finally, to take into account global macroeconomic and financial conditions, we include time-fixed 
effects in the model. These time effects capture the global business cycle, the market sentiment15, the 
availability of liquidities, etc. In particular, after the burst of the high-tech bubble in 2000 and the 
global economic slowdown that followed, we expect bond yields to be higher in average in 1999 than 
in 2001. Alternatively, since the U.S. is perceived as a benchmark market, we can approximate the 
world economic situation by using both the U.S. short-term interest rates, e.g. the 3-month T-Bill yields 
(SHORTUS) and the New York Stock Exchange Composite Share Price Index (STOCKUS). Both 
variables are taken from Datastream. 
 
Data 
 
For the INTEREST regression, we could rely on one additional year (1999) and country (Israel)16. 
Hence, we obtain a larger sample than for the cap rate equation, with 424 observations, over N=53 and 
T=8. This strengthens the GovBond estimation results, by providing for more degrees of freedom. 
However, we exclude from the sample all observations for which the GovBond is higher than 40%. 
This is the case for 16 observations. We believe that these are influential observations, having noticed 
sharp differences in the estimated coefficients and their significance level when they are kept in the 
regressions. 
                                                
15 Favero, Pagano & von Thadden (2004) show that a proxy for the world market sentiment toward 
risk– as measured by the differential between high-risk U.S. corporate bonds and U.S. government 
bonds at the corresponding maturity — is the most important explanatory variable for Euro-area yield 
differentials. 
16 We have real estate data for Israel, but not on a consistent basis. Hence, Israel is excluded from the 
cap rate equation, but we choose to keep it in the interest rate equation to strengthen the estimates.  
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Appendix 4 (Table A1 and A2) shows the correlation matrix between some of the determinants of 
INTEREST. Noteworthy high correlations are indicated in bold. A country’s macroeconomic 
environment is the result of an interlinked and complex system of economic conditions and policies, 
with several feedback effects between different economic variables. For example, we find a correlation 
between the inflation rate, the debt variables, the sovereign risk ratings, and especially with each of the 
qualitative risk indexes (except GOVSTAB).  The mismanagement of macroeconomic policies seems 
to be more acute in countries characterized by high political, legal or investment risks. In fact, very 
high inflation rates are usually considered as the result - rather than the cause - of poor economic 
policies or economic instability. More generally, all the qualitative risk indexes are highly correlated 
between them (except again GOVSTAB) and with the agencies’ credit ratings. Hence, each of these 
ratings reflects the general state of risk in the country. In that sense, they should be used alternatively in 
the spread equation. 
 
5.2 Results for the GovBond equation 
 
Bivariate regressions 
 
As a preliminary exercise, it might be interesting to evaluate the explanatory power of each variable, 
e.g. the variable’s capacity to explain the risk premium on the Treasury bond market. Hence, we 
regress GovBond spread against US-TBOND on each of its determinants individually. These bivariate 
regressions will also be helpful in selecting the final regression model, by looking at the explanatory 
power of each variable. Results are shown in Table 3, where we only indicate the t-test and the R² of 
the bivariate regressions. 
 
Table 3: Pair-wise individual regression 
Dependent variables: spread of the 10-year government bond yields with the US 10-year T-Bond. 
 t-test  R²   t-test  R² 
Indebtedness 
variables 
    Credit ratings    
DEBT -0.62  0.0008  MOODY 14.90 *** 0.5450 
IDEBT 10.34 *** 0.3136  S&P 13.40 *** 0.4988 
DEBTREVENUS 3.06 *** 0.0264      
FOREIGNDEBT 5.83 *** 0.0682  Qualitative variables    
     BUREAU -12.34 *** 0.2635 
Liquidities     LAW -15.94 *** 0.3111 
ACCOUNT -2.32 ** 0.0106  IPROFIL -10.21 *** 0.2809 
EXP -7.85 *** 0.0574      
LIQUID -0.64  0.0009  Risk history    
RESERVES -6.52 *** 0.0302  IMPULSE 7.01 *** 0.2168 
RESERVES% -4.28 *** 0.0107  LAGRATE 16.58 *** 0.6725 
BUDGETBAL -3.90 *** 0.0515  IMF2 7.17 *** 0.2088 
     IMF5 8.06 *** 0.2785 
Macroeconomic policy         
GDP% 0.90  0.0020      
INFL 9.34 *** 0.4705      
Notes: OLS regression of GovBond on the indicated variable and a constant. The t-test is the t-Student 
associated with the coefficient of the variable. Estimation using White heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors. Observations excluded when GovBond>0.4. * = significant at 10%; **=significant at 5%; ***= 
significant at 1%. 
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We start by investigating the explanatory power of the variables measuring indebtedness. The debt as a 
percentage of GDP (DEBT) is not significant and has almost no explanatory power. This might seem 
surprising, but in fact, several stable and low-risk developed countries (Belgium, Italy, France, etc.) are 
dragging very high levels of indebtedness without any consequence on their probability of default. In 
fact, the determining criteria that matters for the risk premium are rather the capacity to honor short-
term maturities, and particularly the interest payments on debt. Hence, the variable having the highest 
explanatory power is the government’s interest payments. It explains around 31% of the risk premium. 
 
All the liquidity variables are significant, except LIQUID, with the ratio of export to GDP (EXP) 
having the highest explanatory power. Concerning the variables characterizing the macroeconomic 
policies, GDP growth (GDP%) does not appear to have a significant impact, but the inflation rate 
(INFL), on the contrary, has an overwhelming explanatory power (47%). The 10-year government 
bond yields are taken in nominal terms. Hence, inflation is already a component of the independent 
variable. Second, since the inflation rate is highly correlated to other risk determinants, high inflation 
rates might signal a general level of country risk: the countries considered more risky tend to be those 
associated with poor macroeconomic policies. This conjecture leads us to express some doubts about 
the interpretation and the selection of the inflation rate variables in the bond yield equation. 
 
The Moody’s and S&P’s credit ratings have a very high explanatory power of respectively 54% and 
49%. This was to be expected since these ratings are specifically designed to appraise the sovereign 
probability of default, taking into account a whole series of quantitative (macroeconomic variables) and 
qualitative (political and legal risks, etc.) variables. The other qualitative determinants have a fairly 
good explanatory power (between 26% and 31%). 
 
Finally, Table 3 shows the persistence of past risk history on current risk perceptions. The average 
long-term bond yield in the last three years (LAGRATE) explains alone about 67% of the current 
spread. Our impulse function variable (IMPULSE) is also significant, with an R² of 21%. The existence 
of current or past lending arrangements with the IMF has also a high explanatory power of about 21% 
(IMF2) to 38% (IMF5). 
 
Multivariate regressions 
 
Using the insights obtained from the previous bivariate regressions, we devise a base regression model, 
selecting a set of right-hand side (RHS) variables that have a good explanatory power, while avoiding 
over-fitting the model with correlated variables that might conceptually have an equivalent effect on 
the long-term bond yield. Hence, we now estimate the full GovBond equation using the following base 
model: 
 
 Debt variables: IDEBT and  FOREIGNDEBT 
 Liquidities: BUDGETBAL, LIQUID or RESERVESP 
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 Macroeconomic policy: GDP growth (GDP%). 
 Risk history: the IMPULSE variable and IMF5. 
 
The OLS and FE results are presented in Table 4 for different specifications. 
 
Table 4: estimation results for the GovBond equation – OLS and FE estimators 
 1A 2A 3A 4A 5A 6A 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS+Time effects FE 
FE+Time 
effects 
IDEBT 0.368*** 
(9.19) - 
0.2963*** 
(10.22) 
0.289*** 
(9.79) 
0.528*** 
(7.34) 
0.4228*** 
(5.19) 
FOREIGNDEBT 0.0304*** 
(4.19) 
0.0451*** 
(4.91) 
0.0111* 
(1.80) 
0.0124** 
(2.08) 
-0.0034 
(-0.24) 
0.0027 
(0.18) 
BUDGETBAL 0.0776 
(1.44) 
-0.2663*** 
(-2.98) - - - - 
LIQUID -0.0009** 
(-2.00) 
-0.0007 
(-1.28) 
-0.0015*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.0015*** 
(-3.72) 
-0.0023*** 
(-2.77) 
-0.0020** 
(-2.23) 
EXP -0.0117*** 
(-3.20) 
-0.0267*** 
(-5.96) 
-0.0065** 
(-2.10) 
-0.0074** 
(-2.26) 
-0.0314*** 
(-2.64) 
0.0014 
(0.11) 
GDP% 0.1282 
(1.31) 
0.1831 
(1.63) 
0.1516* 
(1.92) 
0.2227** 
(2.44) 
-0.0546 
(-0.83) 
-0.0641 
(-0.82) 
IMPULSE - - 0.0029*** 
(5.34) 
0.0029*** 
(5.33) 
0.0024*** 
(3.87) 
0.0020*** 
(3.04) 
IMF5 - - 0.0485*** 
(6.28) 
0.0470*** 
(6.04) 
0.0189*** 
(2.67) 
0.0155** 
(2.29) 
Constant 0.0381*** 
(6.83) 
0.0663*** 
(10.73) 
0.0366*** 
(8.16) 
0.0282*** 
(4.98) 
0.0515*** 
(4.65) 
0.035*** 
(3.29) 
       
F-test Time effects 
(p-value) 
- - 
 - 
2.14* 
(0.0386) 
- 4.98 
(0.0000) 
F-test Country effects 
(p-value) 
- - -  20.22 (0.0000) 
18.57 
(0.0000) 
Nb of obs. 415 415 415 415 415 415 
R² 0.3532 0.1406 0.5967 0.6124 0.8491 0.8576 
Notes: Estimation using White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Observations excluded when 
GovBond>0.4. In parentheses below coefficient: t-statistics. * = significant at 10%; **=significant at 5%; 
***= significant at 1%. 
 
Looking at column 1A of Table 4, the macroeconomic fundamentals alone explain about 35% of 
GovBond. All variables have significant coefficients as well as the expected sign, except GDP% which 
is insignificant though. A higher foreign debt (FOREIGNDEBT) and larger interest payments (IDEBT) 
tend to increase the risk premium, while greater liquidities (LIQUID) and exports (EXP) both 
contribute to lowering the risk premium. Because of the high correlation between the interest payments 
(IDEBT) and the budget balance (BUDGETBAL), the latter is not significant when estimated in 
combination with the former. When IDEBT is pulled out of the regression (column 2A), 
BUDGETBAL becomes significant with the expected negative coefficient: the higher the public budget 
surplus (or the lower the budget deficit), the greater the capacity to confront short-term financial 
engagements. In column 3A, we add the risk history, using the effects of past interest rate shocks 
(IMPULSE) and the indicator of past IMF leading (IMF5). Both variables are highly significant, with a 
positive effect on risk premiums. We are now able to explain about 59% of the risk premium. The 
addition of time-fixed effects (column 4A) improves slightly the fit of the regression and they are 
jointly significant (as indicated by the F-test17 in the lower part of the Table 4). 
 
                                                
17 The F-test evaluates the joint significance of all group of coefficients (here, time or country effects). 
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In the two last columns of Table 4, we proceed to the fixed-effect (FE) estimator. These country-fixed 
effects are also jointly significant. As usual, the addition of country dummy variables increases 
considerably the fit, with an R2 of 0.86 in the regression with time effects (column 6A). With the FE, 
FOREIGNDEBT becomes insignificant, while the coefficient of IDEBT increases notably and remains 
the determinant having the highest significance level. The coefficients of the FE estimator are efficient 
and unbiased – as opposed to the OLS and random effect estimator. Therefore, the long-term bond 
yield fitted values – labeled GovBond-HAT - that will be used latter on in the CAP equation are 
computed from the FE specification 6A (outlined accordingly in Table 4). 
 
Specification 6A includes both time and country fixed effects. As explained previously, the constant 
can then be interpreted as the U.S. specific base risk rate in 2006 (since for identification, this year was 
chosen to be excluded from the time effects), which is about 3.5%. We reprint specification 6A in 
Table 5, but now showing the coefficients for the time effects. As indicated by their positive coefficient 
values, the average GovBond was significantly higher between 1999 and 2001 than in the subsequent 
years. From the base rate of 3.5% in 2006, average rates were about 1.53 p.p. (percentage points) 
higher in 1999, 1.35 p.p. in 2000 and 1.57 p.p. in 2001. 
 
Instead of using time effects, we include in column 1B of Table 5 the variables taking into account the 
US economic cycle. The general evolution of global long-term interest rates tends to follow the U.S. 
economic situation, as shown by the positive coefficient of the U.S. short-term interest rates 
(SHORTUS). But, at the same time, we note a negative correlation between the evolution of 10-year 
bond yields and US stock market returns. This negative correlation is expected by economic theory, but 
in reality, the sign of the correlation between long-term interest rates and stocks is not fixed in time. 
According to Ilmanen (2003), a positive correlation between stock and bond returns prevailed during 
most of the 1900s, but periods of negative correlation was observed in the early 1930s, the latte 1950s, 
and in the recent period. He also found that growth and volatility shocks tend to push stock and bond 
returns in opposite directions. Hence, in periods of stock market weaknesses, of high volatility and of 
economic downturn, we thus expect an increasing negative correlation between the two markets, as 
investors tend to allocate a greater interest into less risky and more stable instruments such as fixed 
income investments. However, the fit is higher when using only the fixed-time effects, which capture 
any kind of global trends and world events, beyond the US specific situation only. 
 
In Table 5, we also investigate the effects of other interesting determinants of risk. In column 2B, we 
replace the country fixed effects with some area fixed effects: the 15 European Union member-states 
before enlargements (EU), the European countries that joined the EU in 2004 or 2007 (ENLARG), the 
Asian countries (ASIA), the Latin American countries (LATIN), and all the remaining countries 
(OTHERS)18, except the U.S. that is again excluded for identification. Now, from a base rate of 1.66 % 
in the U.S. (as indicated by the constant), the risk premium is, in average, about 5.95 p.p. higher for 
Latin American countries, 2.47 p.p. higher in for Asian countries and 1.65 p.p. higher in the EU 
                                                
18 See Appendix 1 for a list of countries with their classification into the four areas.  
 27 
enlargement countries. For European Union member-states, the difference with the U.S. constant is not 
significant.  
Table 5: estimation results for the GovBond equation – OLS and FE estimators 
 Time effects Area effects Qualitative index Credit ratings 
 6A 1B 2B 3B 4B 5B 6B 7B 
 FE+time effect 
OLS+US 
evolution OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
IDEBT 0.4228*** 
(5.19) 
0.507*** 
(7.10) 
0.2498*** 
(8.19) 
0.256*** 
(8.95) 
0.238*** 
(5.71) 
0.225*** 
(5.51) 
- - 
FOREIGNDEBT 0.0027 
(0.18) 
-0.00198 
(-0.13) 
0.0043 
(0.72) 
0.0109* 
(1.81) 
0.0097* 
(1.71) 
0.0060 
(1.03) 
- - 
LIQUID -0.0020** 
(-2.23) 
-0.0021** 
(-2.19) 
-0.003*** 
(-6.76) 
-0.002*** 
(-6.46) 
-0.002*** 
(-4.82) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.99) 
- - 
EXP 0.0014 
(0.11) 
-0.0278** 
(-2.33) 
0.0028 
(-0.90) 
0.0002 
(0.07) 
-0.0065** 
(-1.96) 
-0.0036 
(-1.06) 
- - 
GDP% -0.0641 
(-0.82) 
-0.0571 
(-0.78) 
0.2115** 
(2.39) 
-0.0078 
(-0.11) 
0.1741 
(1.94) 
0.0553 
(0.76) 
- - 
IMPULSE 0.0020*** 
(3.04) 
0.0023*** 
(3.67) 
0.0027*** 
(5.02) 
0.0019*** 
(3.83) 
0.0024*** 
(4.05) 
0.0024*** 
(4.46) 
0.0017*** 
(3.50) 
0.0017*** 
(3.35) 
IMF5 0.0155** 
(2.29) 
0.0177** 
(2.52) 
0.0354*** 
(4.99) 
0.0318*** 
(4.20) 
0.0419*** 
(5.18) 
0.0382*** 
(5.20) 
0.0278*** 
(2.79) 
0.0311*** 
(3.07) 
constant 0.035*** 
(3.29) 
0.019*** 
(3.96) 
0.0166*** 
(2.87) 
0.1136*** 
(8.61) 
0.071*** 
(4.63) 
0.1453*** 
(5.93) 
0.0287*** 
(9.08) 
0.0142*** 
(3.08) 
STOCKUSA - -0.223*** (-2.81) 
- - - - - - 
SHORTUSA - 0.0009 (1.18) 
- - - - - - 
UE - - 0.0027 
(0.85) 
- - - - - 
ENLARG - - 0.0165*** 
(2.69) 
- - - - - 
ASIA - - 0.0247*** 
(3.42) 
- - - - - 
LATIN - - 0.0595*** 
(6.32) 
- - - - - 
OTHERS 
 
  0.0423*** 
(6.26) 
     
BUREAU - - - -0.023*** (-7.23) 
- - - - 
LAW - - - - -0.007*** (-3.33) 
- - - 
IPROFIL - - - - - -0.009*** (-5.09) 
- - 
MOODY - - - - - - 0.0062*** (11.89) 
- 
S&P - - - - - - - 0.0055*** (10.42) 
D1999 0.0153** 
(2.35) 
-       
D2000 0.0135*** 
(2.61) 
-       
D2001 0.0157*** 
(3.42) 
-       
D2002 0.0093** 
(1.97) 
-  -  -  - 
D2003 0.0037 
(0.85) 
-       
D2004 0.0020 
(0.55) 
-       
D2005 -0.00436 
(-1.15) 
-       
F-test Time effects 
(p-value) 
4.98 
0.0000 
- 3.70 
(0.0007) 
4.07 
(0.0003) 
2.99 
(0.0045) 
2.15 
(0.0375) 
3.35 
(0.0018) 
4.43 
(0.0001) 
F-test Country 
effects 
(p-value) 
18.57 
0.0000 
21.35 
(0.0000) 
- - - - - - 
Nb of obs. 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 415 
R² 0.8576 0.8732 0.6914 0.6957 0.6310 0.6739 0.6301 0.6015 
Notes: Estimation using White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Observations excluded when GovBond>0.4. Country 
fixed effects are excluded with the use of area effects, qualitative risk variables and the credit ratings. In parentheses below 
coefficient: t-statistics. * = significant at 10%; **=significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%. 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
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The qualitative risk indexes have also a significant effect on the risk premium (specifications 3B, 4B 
and 5B). The quality of the bureaucracy (BUREAU), law and order (LAW) and the investment profile 
(IPROFIL) have all a significant and negative coefficient: countries that are better rated for these 
characteristics tend to display a lower risk premium. 
 
Finally, instead of using the macroeconomic fundamentals, we investigate the relationship between the 
credit ratings and the risk premium, using the ratings of Moody’s and Standards & Poor’s 
(specifications 6B and 7B). The sovereign credit rating measures the country’s actual default risk. 
Thus, to be complete, we also include the variables of risk history and the time effects. Using this 
condensed model, we are still able to explain 60% (with S&P) and 63% (with MOODY) of the risk 
premium. Hence, the mapping between the risk premium and the credit risk ratings is pretty high. 
Credit ratings are better predictors of the countries’ general risk than the macroeconomic fundamentals 
alone. 
 
6. Results for the capitalization rate equation 
 
Now that we have established and estimated the model for the 10-yr government bond yield equation, 
we are able to estimate the CAP equation. We start by presenting the single equation regressions, using 
GovBond-HAT, the fitted values of the 10-yr government bond yield that are extracted from the 
regression 6A of Table 4. Then, we implement the SURE estimations. 
 
6.1 First empirical strategy: single equation results 
 
Appendix 4 (Table A3) indicates the correlation matrix between the determinants of the cap rate, to 
which we add GDP per capita and Moody’s credit rating. It so happens that the density and depth 
variables are highly correlated with GDP per capita and with the credit ratings. As a result, these two 
real estate variables are also highly correlated with the long-term government bond yields. Hence, we 
get a correlation between the market depth or density and the country risk. Yet, we want this risk effect 
to be taken up by the risk premium in the bond market. We are not really capturing the extent of 
outside options in the market. In order to single out the specific real estate liquidity risk, we have 
performed a regression of each liquidity variables (DEPTH and DENSITY, taken in logs) on GDP per 
capita. Then, the residuals from these regressions, labeled DEPTH-HAT and DENSITY-HAT, are 
taken as liquidity variables. These residuals measure in fact the liquidity of the market given the level 
of economic development (or risk). In this way, we obtain variables that are orthogonal to the country 
risk assessment, as already measured by the long-term bond yield. 
 
In Table 6, we first investigate the performance of the variables that we have constructed - the 10-yr 
government bond yield (GovBond-HAT), depth (DEPTH-HAT) and density (DENSITY-HAT) - 
compared to their actual values. In the first two columns, we simply regress the cap rate on GovBond 
(column 1C) and on its estimated value (column 2C). As predicted by the CAPM model, there is a 
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positive relationship between the risk premium on government bonds and the cap rate. GovBond alone 
explains between 41% (with the actual value) to 44% (with GovBond-HAT) of the real estate yield. As 
explained previously, the estimated value GovBond-HAT will be used in the next regressions to avoid 
any endogeneity problems. 
 
Table 6: estimation results for the CAP equation 
 1C 2C 3C 4C 5C 6C 7C 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
GOVBOND 0.3922*** (9.46) - - - - - - 
GOVBOND-HAT - 0.4292*** (10.76) - 
0.2842*** 
(6.89) 
0.4021*** 
(9.98) 
.3229*** 
(8.05) 
.4093*** 
(10.12) 
FUND - - 0.3470*** (7.54) - - - - 
EFFECT - - 0.5508*** (13.80) - - - - 
LN(DEPTH) - - - -0.0089*** (-9.70) - - - 
DEPTH-HAT  - - - - 
-0.0066*** 
(-5.08) - - 
LN(DENSITY) - - - - - -.0082*** (-9.57) - 
DENSITY-HAT  - - - - - - 
-.0064*** 
(-6.54) 
REIT - - - -0.0012 (-0.57) 
-0.0073*** 
(-2.92) 
-.0022 
(-1.07) 
-.0068*** 
(-2.92) 
constant 0.05542*** (19.36) 
0.0525*** 
(19.47) 
0.0585*** 
(17.83) 
0.0859*** 
(17.34) 
0.0572*** 
(18.60) 
.1529*** 
(13.30) 
.0569*** 
(18.74) 
        
Nombre obs. 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 
R² 0.4115 0.4419 0.4705 0.5848 0.4945 0.5858 0.5127 
Notes: Estimation using White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Observations excluded when GovBond>0.4. 
In parentheses below coefficient: t-statistics. * = significant at 10%; **=significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%. 
 
At this point, it might be interesting to breakdown GovBond-HAT into a component determined only 
by the fundamentals and history variables (FUND) and a component representing the fixed country 
effects (EFFECT). The country effects correspond simply to the estimated coefficient of the country 
dummies. FUND is then the predicted value of GovBond based on the X variables (IDEBT, 
FOREIGNDEBT, LIQUID, EXP, GDP%, IMPULSE and IMF5), the constant and the time effects, less 
the country effects. In regression 3C of Table 6, both components of GovBond are used as determinants 
of the cap rate. The country fixed risk effects (EFFECT) have a higher coefficient value than the 
component based on fundamentals and history (FUND). The former is also more significant. It shows 
that the fixed country perception is a more significant determinant of the real estate yield than 
macroeconomic fundamentals. 
 
Turning to real estate liquidity variables, both measures (DEPTH, DENSITY) have a high significant 
level and their coefficients and t-tests are almost identical. The same can be said for their respective 
estimated values (DEPTH-HAT, DENSITY-HAT), but the coefficients of the estimated values are 
lower than the actual values, with a lower t-test. This was to be expected since the estimated values are 
whitened of the general country risk perception as measured here by the level of economic 
development. Indeed, the coefficient of GovBond-HAT is much lower when the actual values of 
DEPTH and DENSITY are used. When the fitted values are included instead, the GovBond coefficient 
returns to a value around 0.4. This shows that we are rightly capturing the liquidity of the real estate 
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market, conditioning on the economic development level of the country. Since the results for DEPTH-
HAT and DENSITY-HAT are almost identical, we prefer to work with the density variable that has a 
more convenient interpretation in terms of real estate markets19. The existence of REITs in the country 
contributes to lowering the risk premium, but this indicator is not always significant. 
 
Table 7: estimation results for the CAP equation 
 1D 2D 3D 4D 5D 
 OLS OLS FE FE + Time effect 
RE + Time 
effect 
GOVBOND-HAT 0.3991*** (10.06) 
0.3911*** 
(9.78) 
0.3908*** 
(8.94) 
0.2335*** 
(3.40) 
0.3390*** 
(7.91) 
DENSITY-HAT - -0.0050*** (-4.83) 
-0.0082** 
(-2.59) 
-0.0143** 
(-2.06) 
-0.0084*** 
(-4.60) 
REIT - -0.0079*** (-3.14) 
0.0018 
(0.35) 
0.0044 
(0.90) 
0.0005 
(0.14) 
LN(RENTS) 0.0198*** (2.79) 
0.0180** 
(2.49) 
0.0036 
(0.69) 
0.0059 
(1.07) 
0.0096* 
(1.87) 
VACANCY% -0.0053** (-2.42) 
-0.0040* 
(-1.75) 
- - - 
GDP% (-1) 0.1113* (1.77) 
0.0398 
(0.64) 
0.0228 
(0.68) 
0.06868** 
(1.97) 
0.0641* 
(1.90) 
constant -0.0391 (-1.28) 
-0.0246 
(-0.79) 
0.0313 
(0.95) 
0.0015 
(0.04) 
0.0038 
(0.16) 
      
F-test Time effects 
(p-value) 
- - - 4.83 
(0.0001) 
31.53 
(0.0000) 
F-test Country effects 
(p-value) 
- - 26.29 
(0.0000) 
26.08 
(0.0000) 
- 
Hausman test 
(p-value) 
- - - - 13.87 
(0.2403) 
Nombre obs. 308 308 357 357 357 
R² 0.4998 0.5457 0.8385 0.8575 - 
Notes: OLS estimation using White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Observations 
excluded when GovBond>0.4. In parentheses below coefficient: t-statistics. * = significant at 
10%; **=significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%. 
 
We now estimate in Table 7 the full cap rate model by adding the proxies for the growth of NOI: rents, 
growth of vacancy rate and lagged GDP growth. Contrary to the CAPM model, these variables have a 
positive impact on the cap rate. In the case of VACANCY%, recall that a decreasing vacancy rate 
signals higher expectations of NOI growth. Hence, the negative coefficient still indicates that the 
expected growth of NOI, expected from a lower vacancy rate, has a positive effect on cap rates. This 
unexpected positive effect may indicate that these variables are in fact poor proxies for future NOI 
growth. Furthermore, it might be that real estate prices do not adjust instantly to the expectations of 
NOI growth. From our CAPM model, the evolution of rents should be rationally taken into account in 
the pricing of real estate. Hence, the cap rate should be mean reverting in time. But Sivitanides, 
Southard, Torto & Wheaton (2001) show that, for the US metropolitan markets, capitalization rates are 
not mean-reverting: investors seem to appraise the time path of rental growth by looking myopically 
backward and not forward. In any event, the growth proxies are not significant with fixed effects or 
when the real estate liquidity variables are included in the regressions. 
 
                                                
19 We believe that real estate markets that are evaluated through their Highest and Best Use (HBU) will 
display higher density levels (ex: New York vs. Phoenix) therefore attracting more investments, and 
thus represent a better liquidity proxy than DEPTH (population/inventory).  
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Note that, when using VACANCY%, we lose one year of observations. Since we expect a fairly high 
relationship between GDP%, RENTS and VACANCY%20, we choose to withdraw VACANCY% in all  
 
Table 8: estimation results for the CAP equation 
 Area effects Qualitative index Credit ratings 
 1E 2E 3E 4E 5E 6E 
 
FE + Time 
effect 
4D 
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS 
GOVBOND-HAT 0.2335*** 
(3.40) 
0.2755*** 
(7.12) 
0.2520*** 
(5.04) 
.2741*** 
(6.07) 
.3146*** 
(6.54) 
0.1316*** 
(2.58) 
0.1468*** 
(2.91) 
DENSITY-HAT -0.0143*** 
(-2.06) 
-0.0017* 
(-1.67) 
-0.0046*** 
(-4.93) 
-.00685** 
(-6.69) 
-.0059*** 
(-5.50) 
-0.005*** 
(-6.09) 
-0.0054*** 
(-6.44) 
REIT 0.0044 
(0.90) 
-0.0029 
(-1.347) 
-0.0021 
(-1.00) 
-.0062*** 
(-2.97) 
-.00479** 
(-2.08) 
-0.0014 
(-0.74) 
-0.00097 
(-0.50) 
LN(RENTS) 0.0059 
(1.07) 
0.0197*** 
(3.20) 
0.0098 
(1.45) 
.0164** 
(2.47) 
.01940*** 
(2.80) 
0.0211*** 
(3.39) 
0.0232*** 
(3.59) 
GDP% (-1) 0.06868** 
(1.97) 
0.1516*** 
(2.89) 
0.0125 
(0.23) 
.0516 
(0.95) 
.03563 
(0.66) 
0.01238 
(0.26) 
-0.00615 
(-0.11) 
constant 0.0015 
(0.04) 
-0.0326 
(-1.22) 
0.0507 
(1.55) 
.0155 
(0.50) 
.0002 
(0.01) 
-0.0494* 
(-1.77) 
-0.0681** 
(-2.33) 
UE - -0.0196*** 
(-5.82) 
- - - - - 
ENLARG - 0.0163*** 
(2.94) 
- - - - - 
EU-ENTRY  -0.0242*** 
(-3.30) 
- - - - - 
ASIA - -0.0218*** 
(-5.46) 
- - - - - 
LATIN - 0.0175*** 
(3.40) 
- - - - - 
OTHERS  -0.0054 
(-1.49) 
     
BUREAU - - -0.0131*** 
(-5.63) 
- - - - 
LAW - - - -0.0081*** 
(-5.79) 
- - - 
IPROFIL - - - - -0.0034*** 
(-3.04) 
- - 
MOODY - - - - - 0.0035*** 
(7.36) 
- 
S&P - - - - - - 0.0032*** 
(6.37) 
D2000 0.0179*** 
(3.84) 
      
D2001 0.0128*** 
(3.21) 
      
D2002 0.0174*** 
(4.75) 
      
D2003 0.0165*** 
(5.11) 
      
D2004 0.0131*** 
(3.55) 
      
D2005 0.0068** 
(2.42) 
      
F-test Time 
(p-value) 
4.83 
(0.0001) 
3.66 
(0.0016) 
3.36 
(0.0032) 
3.78 
(0.0012) 
3.14 
(0.0051) 
3.16 
(0.0049) 
4.13 
(0.0005) 
F-test Country 
effects 
(p-value) 
26.08 
(0.0000) 
- - - - - - 
Nombre obs. 357 357 357 357 357 357 357 
R2 0.8575 0.6779 0.5971 0.6050 0.5667 0.6495 0.6511 
Notes: OLS estimation using White heteroscedasticity robust standard errors. Observations excluded when 
GovBond>0.4. Country fixed effects are excluded with the use of area effects, qualitative risk variables and the credit 
ratings. In parentheses below coefficient: t-statistics. * = significant at 10%; **=significant at 5%; ***= significant at 
1%. 
 
                                                
20 In periods of strong economic growth, where the absorption rate in office space is generally higher 
than the pace of new supply, the vacancy rate will decrease rapidly putting upward pressure on rental 
rates. 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
See 
F-test 
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of the following regressions in order to increase the efficiency of the country-individual effect 
estimations.  
 
The fixed-effect (FE) results are presented in columns 3D and 4D. The noteworthy outcome is the 
absence of significance for the NOI growth proxies, except for the lagged GDP% in 4D (at the 10% 
level only). Rent growth proxies seem to be captured by the fixed country effect, as if investors are in 
fact assigning a fixed growth expectation (up to the time sample) to each national real estate market. 
The REIT dummy is also insignificant, but this zero-one indicator is mostly absorbed by the country 
dummies. In column 5D, we also print the random effect (RE) estimator, which can be compared to the 
FE estimator. The RE estimator would be more efficient, except if there is a correlation between the 
country effects and any of the X variables. The Hausman test shown in Table 7 compares the 
coefficients of the RE estimators (5D) with those of the FE estimators (4D). The Hausman test rejects 
the existence of any systematic differences between both sets of coefficients. Hence, the issue of 
endogeneity might not be too problematic in this case. 
 
Further interesting results are presented in Table 8. We reprint again specification 4D, but showing the 
coefficients of the time effects which are all significant. In average, the cap rate has decreased 
considerably since 2002: it was, in average, 0.68 p.p. higher in 2005, 1.31 p.p. in 2004, 1.65 p.p. in 
2003 and 1.74 p.p. in 2002. 
 
In specification 1E, we include area effects, similarly to the CAP equation. Compared to the U.S. 
specific-effect (given by the constant), the 15 EU and Asian countries tend to post, in average, a lower 
cap rate of about 1.96 p.p. and 2.19 p.p. respectively while Latin American countries have, in average, 
a higher level of cap rate of about 1.75 p.p.. In the case of the EU enlargement countries (ENLARG), 
the cap rate tends to be higher (1.63 p.p.), but we note a sharp decrease in the cap rate from 2004 
onward, e.g. from the year of entry into the EU. To show this, we have constructed a dummy equal to 1 
from the first year of entry into the EU, and zero otherwise (EU-ENTRY). This indicator is negative 
and significant: the cap rate of EU enlargement countries tends to be 2.42 p.p. lower from the first year 
of official entry in the EU relatively to their pre-accession level. 
 
The qualitative variables (specifications 2E, 3E and 4E) are all significant at the 1% level. Again, a 
country which is better rated tends to have a lower risk premium on the cap rate. Since the credit 
ratings are very good predictors of the risk premium, we have also tested the effect on the sovereign 
credit ratings in specifications 5E and 6E. Both ratings (MOODY and S&P) are highly significant and 
their coefficient is positive: a poor rating tends to increase a country’s risk premium on the cap rate. 
Again, these sovereign credit ratings are composite indicators taking into account all types of risks, and 
some of these risks seem to affect also the real estate market. 
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6.2 Second empirical strategy: SURE results 
 
Finally, we implement the SURE procedure in Table 9. Time fixed effects are included in all 
regressions. In column 1F, we first estimate the fixed effect SURE. This estimator is efficient and 
unbiased since the inclusion of country dummies removes the fixed effect from the residuals, solving 
the autocorrelation and the endogeneity problem. Hence, with fixed effects, the SURE only considers 
the correlation between the remaining disturbances (idiosyncratic shocks). We indicate in the last lines 
of Table 9 the correlation between the residuals of both equations as well as the p-value. This 
correlation is negative (-0.094) and significant at the 10% level. 
 
In column 2F, we present the random effect RE-SURE estimator, but without using any instruments to 
correct for endogeneity. Now, the correlation between both equations includes the correlation between 
the individual effects and the correlation between the remaining disturbances. The total correlation is 
quite low (0. 182) and not significant. However, if we take only the correlation between the individual 
effects, we obtain a positive and significant correlation of 0.148. 
 
In column 3F, we implement the full Hausman-Taylor SURE random effect. For this procedure, we 
need to identify which variables are doubly exogenous and which ones are singly exogenous. 
Moreover, for identification, exogenous and endogenous time-invariant variables have to be also 
included in the regression21. There is no formal decision rule to identify which variables are singly or 
doubly exogenous. In the GovBond equation, the variables that seem to characterize the most the inter-
temporal country risk perceptions are the interest payments (IDEBT), the level of the foreign debt 
(FOREIGNDEBT), the existence of IMF lending arrangements in the current and in the past two years 
(IMF5) and the response function (IMPULSE). In the CAP equation, as a rule, we set as endogenous 
the variables that are in level (GovBond, DENSITY and REIT), while the variables measuring the 
changes in time (GDP%, RENT) are assumed to be exogenous. 
 
In both equations, we include as an exogenous time-invariant variable a dummy variable equal to one 
for emerging countries (EMERG) and zero otherwise (see Appendix 1). Emerging countries 
corresponds to high-risk countries (such as Argentina and Russia) but also to relatively low-risk and 
stable countries (such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, etc.). Hence, it should be relatively 
exogenous to the specific country effect. As an endogenous time-invariant variable, we use IMF2, 
which equals 1 if the country has had any lending arrangements with the IMF between 1995 and 1999. 
 
With the Hausman-Taylor SURE random effect, the correlation between the individual effects becomes 
surprisingly negative (-0.119). Recall that, in order to implement the Hausman-Taylor methodology, 
two time-invariant variables were added to the model (IMF2 and EMERG). The addition of these two  
 
                                                
21 The reader is referred to the paper of Hausman & Taylor (1981) for a more comprehensive 
explanation of the IV procedure. 
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Table 9: estimation results for the CAP equation – SURE regressions 
 1F 2F 3F 
 SURE FE 
SURE 
GLS RE 
SURE 
Hausman-
Taylor 
CAP equation    
GOVBOND 0.1961*** 
(5.94) 
0.2830*** 
(9.59) 
0.1912*** 
(5.79) 
DENSITY-HAT -0.0123*** 
(-4.27) 
-0.0079*** 
(-4.71) 
-0.0114*** 
(-4.01) 
REIT 0.0044 
(1.02) 
-0.00157 
(-0.42) 
0.0044 
(1.01) 
LN(RENTS) 0.0077 
(1.58) 
0.0137*** 
(2.65) 
0.0074 
(1.52) 
%GDP(-1) 0.0805*** 
(2.58) 
0.0852*** 
(2.57) 
0.0781** 
(2.47) 
IMF2 - - 0.01014 (0.66) 
EMERG - - 0.0129 (0.56) 
constant 0.0203 
(0.82) 
-0.0131 
(-0.53) 
-0.0072 
(-0.28) 
F-Test Time 
(p-value) 
66.99 
(0.0000) 
41.77 
(0.0000) 
65.26 
(0.0000) 
F-Test Country effects 
(p-value) 
841.91 
(0.0000) - - 
R² 0.8617 0.7827 0.4926 
    
GovBond equation    
IDEBT 0.4895*** 
(11.64) 
0.3564*** 
(11.80 
0.4886*** 
(10.43) 
FOREIGNDEBT -0.0082 
(-0.88) 
0.0089 
(1.04) 
-0.0063 
(-0.45) 
LIQUID -0.0021*** 
(-3.43) 
-0.0017*** 
(-3.60) 
-0.0019*** 
(-2.76) 
EXP -0.0011 
(-0.06) 
-0.00027 
(-0.04) 
0.0034 
(0.63) 
GDP% 0.0210 
(0.41) 
0.02687 
(0.52) 
0.02154 
(0.36) 
IMPULSE 0.0037*** 
(10.27) 
0.0030*** 
(8.16) 
0.0031*** 
(7.63) 
IMF5 0.01782*** 
(4.40) 
0.0203*** 
(4.62) 
0.01674*** 
(3.49) 
EMERG - - -0.04113 
(-0.29) 
IMF2 - - 0.0254 
(1.11) 
constant 0.0428 
(1.09) 
0.1079*** 
(7.55) 
0.07242 
(1.37) 
F-Test Time 
(p-value) 
19.08 
(0.0040) 
67.09 
(0.0000) 
22.67 
(0.0019) 
F-Test Country effects 
(p-value) 
1058.44 
(0.0000) - - 
R² 0.9064 0.7507 0.6070 
    
Cross-equation correlation    
Total residuals: E(z1it z2it) 
(p-value) 
-0.09491 
(0.0732) 
0.0824 
(0.1201) 
-0.0719 
(0.1750) 
    
Individual effects: E(u1it u2it) 
(p-value) - 
0.1485 
(0.0020) 
-0.1193 
(0.0131) 
    
Nb. obs. 357 357 357 
Observations excluded when GovBond>0.4. In parentheses below coefficient: t-
statistics. * = significant at 10%; **=significant at 5%; ***= significant at 1%. 
1. In the case of the FE estimator, the total residuals z corresponds to the 
regression residuals e, since the individual dummy variables are included in the 
model. 
 
variables in each equation could have affected the cross-equation correlation. More generally, the 
efficiency of the Hausman-Taylor methodology relies on the quality of the instruments. Unfortunately, 
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as already mentioned, it is not easy to find good instruments in the context of country risk evaluation. If 
the interest lies only in the estimate of unbiased coefficients, and not in investigating the correlation 
between the bond and real estate markets, then the results of the FE-SURE become the appropriate 
benchmark. Nevertheless, the coefficients of the Hausman-Taylor SURE-RE are remarkably close to 
those of the SURE-FE. In fact, they are not too far apart from the benchmark single equation FE 
estimator 4D (Table 7), except for the long-term bond yield. For the bond yield, we have used the fitted 
values in the single FE equation, while the actual values are tested in the SURE estimations. Second, by 
considering the cross-equation correlation, the SURE procedure takes into account another channel 
linking the long-term bond interest rate and the cap rate. 
 
Examining now the coefficient of GovBond obtained from the Hausman-Taylor SURE-RE, we do find 
a positive and significant relationship between these two yields, as predicted by the CAPM model. We 
can estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the 10-year bond yield rate will raise the cap rate by 
about 0.19 percentage point. This point estimate may seem low, but it should be remembered that the 
Hausman-Taylor SURE-RE already includes country specific risk effects. The effect of the risk 
premium on the bond market is to be added to these permanent country risk assessments. 
 
Looking at the GovBond equation, all the variables have the expected sign, except FOREIGNDEBT, 
EXP and GDP% which are not significant though. For the variables that remain significant, the 
coefficients are more or less close to the single equation FE estimation (specification 6A of Table 4), 
which is our unbiased single equation benchmark. 
 
More generally, in both the 10-yr government bond yield and the cap rate models, the country specific 
risk effects are highly significant and they reveal the existence of time-invariant country characteristics 
or permanent risk perception that affects the risk premiums. This may indicate for example that 
investors develop for each country a fixed or preconceived risk assessment which may or may not be 
related to the country’s actual economic situation. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have attempted to investigate the determinants of the real estate capitalization rate by 
using a sample of developed and emerging countries. Our assumption, based on a Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM), is that the capitalization rate should be at least proportional to the country’s risk 
perception, as measured by the risk premium on the 10-year government bond yield. 
 
Our results show that government bond yield is the main determinant of the cap rate. It explains alone 
41% to 44% of the capitalization rate level. Based on a Hausman-Taylor random effect SURE 
estimator, we estimate that a 1 percentage point increase in the government bond yield will raise the 
capitalization rate by about 0.19 percentage point. 
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Real estate variables play also a role, but to a lesser extent. The depth and the density of property 
inventory have a significant and negative effect on the real estate risk premium, as investors prefer to 
operate in larger markets in order to minimize transaction costs, hedge out price variability and exploit 
the availability of a larger pool of exit strategies. The results regarding rental growth expectations (rent 
index, changes in the vacancy rate and GDP growth) are less conclusive. These variables do not have a 
high and consistent explanatory power on the capitalization rate, especially when fixed country effects 
are included in the regression as if investors are in fact assigning a fixed growth expectation to each 
country. However, the mere fact that they appear as being significant in some regressions might be an 
indication that real estate prices are not necessarily adjusting instantly to changes in the net operating 
income of the office building. 
 
Our empirical strategy also required the estimation of a model explaining the 10-year bond yield. 
Macroeconomic fundamentals are significant determinants of the risk premium on the bond market, but 
the crucial determinant is the country’s capacity to honor short-term financial engagements. But these 
fundamentals are not sufficient to completely explain the bond yield: the country’s risk history is also a 
very important determinant. Past crises have a long-term effect on the investors’ current risk 
perception, independently of the country’s actual macroeconomic situation. 
 
Finally, we show that both real estate and long-term bond yields are characterized by a fixed country 
risk component and that these country effects might be correlated between these two markets. Hence, 
by using the SURE estimator, we are able to take into account this cross-equation correlation. 
 
Future research on the determinants of the real estate capitalization rate – and its relationship with the 
risk premium on the bond market – will depend crucially on the availability of real estate data, 
especially for emerging countries. The next step would be to investigate this issue at the city level, 
which is more relevant for understanding real estate markets than national data. As already mentioned, 
it would also be interesting to consider longer time-series, since the capitalization rate seems to obey to 
particular stochastic processes, and in particular the mean-reverting properties of the real estate yield. 
Finally, another line of research would be to examine how investors structure their risk assessment 
when investing in emerging property markets compared to developed ones. Across developed 
countries, differences in country risk levels are marginal. One can assume then that investors will grant 
more importance to real estate fundamentals than the level of country risk when conducting a due 
diligence in a developed country’s property market compared to an emerging country. Inversely, 
investors might be much more sensitive to the higher investment risks associated to most emerging 
countries, which might outweigh any favorable real estate conditions. Second, because emerging 
markets are mostly demand-driven, changes in the new office supply curve might have a lesser effect 
on foreign investment decisions. Therefore, when investing in an emerging property market, the 
investor will mostly focus its analysis on the economic growth rate potential (the demand) and the 
investment risks (level of transparency, political stability and profit repatriation) rather than real estate 
cycle. 
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Appendix 1: list of countries 
 
List of countries in the sample, and their classification into emerging countries (EMERG) - as opposed 
to developed countries, European Union member-states before enlargements (15 countries), the EU 
membership candidates that joined the EU in 2004 or 2007, the Asian countries and the Latino 
American countries. 
 
 
Emerg. EU15 
EU 
Candi-
dates 
Asia Latin-Amer.   Emerg. EU15 
EU 
Candi-
dates 
Asia Latin-Amer. 
Argentina *    *  Lithuania *  *   
Australia       Luxembourg  *    
Austria  *     Malaysia *   *  
Belgium  *     Mexico *    * 
Brazil *    *  Netherlands  *    
Bulgaria   *    New Zealand      
Canada       Norway      
Chile *    *  Peru *     
China *   *   Philippines *   *  
Colombia *    *  Poland *  *   
Czech *  *    Portugal  *    
Denmark  *     Romania *  *   
Estonia *  *    Russia *     
Finland  *     Singapore *   *  
France  *     Slovakia *  *   
Germany  *     South Africa      
Greece  *     Spain  *    
Hong Kong    *   Sweden  *    
Hungary *  *    Switzerland      
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India *      Taiwan *   *  
Indonesia *   *   Thailand *   *  
Ireland  *     Turkey *     
Israel       UK  *    
Italy  *     USA      
Japan    *   Ukraine *     
Korea *   *   Venezuela *    * 
Latvia *  *          
Lithuania *  *          
 
Appendix 2: list of cities 
 
Country Available cities  Country Available cities 
Argentina Buenos Aires  Mexico Mexico City 
Australia Melbourne  Netherlands Amsterdam 
 Perth  New Zealand Auckland 
 Sydney   Wellington 
Austria Vienna  Norway Oslo 
Belgium Antwerp  Peru Lima 
 Brussels  Philippines Manila 
Brazil Rio de Janeiro  Poland Warsaw 
 Sao Paulo  Portugal Lisbon 
Bulgaria Sofia  Romania Bucharest 
Canada Calgary  Russia Moscow 
 Montreal  Singapore Singapore 
 Ottawa  Slovakia Bratislava 
 Toronto  South Africa Cape Town 
 Vancouver   Durban 
Chile Santiago   Johannesburg 
China Beijing  Spain Barcelona 
 Guangzhou   Madrid 
 Shanghai  Sweden Stockholm 
Colombia Bogota  Switzerland Geneva 
Czech Prague   Zurich 
Denmark Copenhagen  Taiwan Taipei 
Estonia Tallinn  Thailand Bangkok 
Finland Helsinki  Turkey Istanbul 
France Paris  UK London 
Germany Berlin  USA Atlanta 
 Düsseldorf   Boston 
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Appendix 3: Sources of data 
 
Variables Source 
Interest rates  
→ 10-year treasury bond interest rate or equivalent long-term 
interest rate. 
Datastream; 
Bloomberg; 
Eurostat. 
→ Monthly short-term interest rate Datastream 
  
Solvency variables  
→ Government Debt (% of GDP) Moody's Country Credit Statistical Handbook 
→  External Debt (%GDP) ICRG/PRS Group 
→ Government Debt/Government Revenue Moody's Country Credit Statistical Handbook 
→ Short-term debt (% of exports of goods, services and income) World Bank: World Development Indicator 
→ Total debt service (% of exports of goods, services and income) World Bank: World Development Indicator 
→ Government budget balance (%GDP) World Economic Outlook; European Central Bank 
→ International liquidities as months of import cover ICRG/PRS Group 
→ Government Interest Payment/Government Revenue Moody's Country Credit Statistical Handbook 
→ Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (US$) Moody's Country Credit Statistical Handbook 
  
External trade variables  
→ Current account balance (in US$) World Economic Outlook 
→ Current account balance in % of GDP World Economic Outlook 
→ Exports of goods and services (current US$) World Bank: World Development Indicator; 
EIU 
→ Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank: World Development Indicator; EIU 
→ Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank: World Development Indicator; EIU 
→ Trade balance (in US$) EIU 
→ Openness of the Economy (%GDP) Moody's Country Credit Statistical Handbook 
  
GDP variables  
→ GDP (current US$) World Economic Outlook 
→ GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) World Economic Outlook 
→ Growth of GDP in real term (annual % change) World Economic Outlook 
→ Growth of GDP per capita in real term (annual % change) World Economic Outlook 
  
Other variables  
→ Inflation, consumer price (annual % change) World Economic Outlook 
 Existence of financial arrangements with IMF International Monetary Fund 
→ US New York stock exchange composite share price index Datastream 
→ Country population World Bank; World Development Indicator 
  
Qualitative index  
→ Bureaucracy Quality ICRG/PRS Group 
→ Government Stability ICRG/PRS Group 
→ Investment Profile ICRG/PRS Group 
→ Moody's Credit Ratings Moody's Sovereign Ratings List 
→ Standard & Poor's Credit Ratings S&P_Sovereign Ratings History 
  
  
Real estate variables  
→ Capitalization rate by city Colliers: Office Global Insights 2000-2006; DTZ 
Property Market Analysis; 
Bentall; 
REIS; 
Ober Haus Real Estate Adivsors 
Property Management Association 
→ Vacancy rate by city Idem 
→ Inventory by city (Sq.ft/yr) Idem 
→ Rents by city (€/Sq.m/yr or US$/Sq.ft/yr) Idem 
→ Population by city PMA www.citypopulation.com; 
REIS; 
Colliers; 
Australian bureau of statistics; 
National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria; National 
Statistical Office of Austria; 
National Institute of Statistics of Belgium 
Statistics South Africa 
→ Existence of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) Bloomberg 
→ City area (km²)  
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Appendix 4: correlation matrix 
 
Table A1: Correlation matrix for the determinants of the 10-years Government bond interest rate. 
 INFL           
IDEBT 0,44 IDEBT          
FOREIGNDEBT 0,21 0,18 FOREIGNDEBT        
BUDGETBAL -0,12 -0,47 -0,08 BUDGETBAL       
EXP -0,18 -0,32 -0,17 0,27 EXP       
ACCOUNT -0,06 -0,09 -0,23 0,36 0,46 CACCOUNTP     
LIQUID 0,04 0,08 -0,09 -0,10 -0,10 0,30 LIQUID     
RESERVESP -0,10 -0,12 -0,01 0,11 0,67 0,39 0,41 RESERVESP   
GDP% -0,09 -0,03 -0,04 0,13 0,21 -0,01 -0,04 0,23 GDP%(-1)   
MOODY 0,55 0,51 0,35 -0,25 -0,18 -0,05 0,26 0,13 0,20 MOODY  
SP 0,55 0,51 0,39 -0,30 -0,22 -0,14 0,23 0,09 0,27 0,94  
 
Table A2: Correlation matrix for the qualitative variables, credit ratings and GDP per 
capita. 
 MOODY      
SP 0,942 SP     
BUREAU -0,770 -0,791 BUREAU    
LAW -0,732 -0,768 0,693 LAW   
IPROFIL -0,713 -0,687 0,575 0,480 IPROFIl  
GDPCAP -0,782 -0,805 0,732 0,686 0,589 GDPCAP 
IDEBT 0,509 0,508 -0,257 -0,488 -0,399 -0,454 
 
Table A3: Correlation matrix for the determinants of the CAP equation, plus GDP per capita and Moody’s 
credit rating 
MOODY MOODY       
GDPCAP -0,775 GDPCAP      
INTEREST 0,729 -0,509 INTEREST     
DEPTH -0,748 0,762 -0,466 DEPTH     
DENSITY -0,559 0,624 -0,352 0,892 DENSITY   
REIT -0,279 0,354 -0,151 0,257 0,227 REIT   
RENT 0,112 -0,144 0,073 -0,233 -0,241 0,060 RENT  
VACANCY% -0,267 0,234 -0,162 0,278 0,276 0,014 -0,084 VACANCY% 
GDP%(-1) 0,245 -0,287 0,094 -0,419 -0,390 -0,187 0,224 -0,162 
 
